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The legislature could limit the statute to provide such a right only
to juveniles. The second statute provides in part: "The attorney ad-
vising the witness shall only advise such witness concerning his
right to answer or not to answer ... and shall not otherwise engage
in the proceedings.4 8
Such a statute would assure that the waiver requirements of
Dino are met and would in no significant way either "interfere with
the effective and expeditious discharge of the grand jury's duties," 9
"saddle a grand jury with minitrials and preliminary showings [that]
would . . . impede its investigation,"5 or "delay and disrupt grand
jury proceedings."51 By avoiding these disruptive effects, such a
statute would maintain the integrity of the grand jury system and
would offer the greatest protection to the juvenile's right against
self-incrimination.
William Blake Bennett
THE PROBLEMATIC APPLICATION OF Succession of Brown
Plaintiffs, decedent father's four acknowledged illegitimate child-
ren, sued to annul a judgment of possession recognizing decedent's
adopted child as the sole heir. The plaintiffs attacked the constitu-
tionality of article 919 of the Louisiana Civil Code, which prohibits
acknowledged illegitimates from participating in the succession of
their father if he is survived by legitimate descendants, ascendants,
collateral relations, or spouse.' The trial court rendered judgment
rejecting the plaintiff's demands. This decision was reversed by the
Second Circuit Court of Appeal, and the case was remanded for a
new judgment of possession to be entered, recognizing plaintiffs as
heirs.! The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed, declaring article 919
48. Id at § 10.27.080 (1971).
49. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974).
50. United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1, 17 (1973).
51. United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 349 (1974).
1. LA. CIV. CODE art. 919 provides:
Illegitimate children are called to the inheritance of their father, who has duly
acknowledged them, when he has left no descendants nor ascendants, nor col-
lateral relations, nor surviving wife, and to the exclusion only of the state.
In all other cases, they can only bring an action against their father or his heirs
for alimony, the amount of which shall be determined, as is directed in the Title:
Of Father and Child.
2. 379 So. 2d 1172 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
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unconstitutional under provisions of both the Louisiana and Federal
Constitutions,3 in that "[tihe distinction drawn by art. 919 between
these acknowledged illegitimates and all other relations of the dece-
dent is arbitrary, capricious, and unreasonable."4 Succession of
Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
The constitutionality of article 919 was upheld by the United
States Supreme Court in its 1971 decision of Labine v. Vincent.' The
plaintiff, an acknowledged illegitimate son of the intestate deceased
father, was excluded from sharing in the succession by collateral
relations of the father. The Court, in a 5-4 decision, applied a test of
"minimum rationality"' and deferred to the state's power to pro-
mulgate rules for the purposes of regulating the disposition of prop-
erty within the state and protecting legitimate family relationships.7
The Labine Court emphasized that Louisiana's succession laws did
not create an "insurmountable barrier"8 preventing the illegitimate
3. The court found article 919 to be invalid under the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution, which provides in perti-
nent part: "[n]o state shall make or enforce any law which shall ... deny to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. Arti-
cle 919 was also determined to be in violation of article 1, section 3 of the Louisiana
Constitution, which states: "No law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth ... " LA. CONST. art. I, § 3.
4. Succession of Brown, 388 So. 2d 1151, 1154 (La. 1980).
5. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Prior to the time Labine was decided two other decisions
were handed down by the United States Supreme Court involving Louisiana laws and
illegitimate's rights. Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), in which acknowledged ille-
gitimate children were deemed to have a right to recover damages under the Lou-
isiana wrongful death statute for the death of their mother, and Glona v. American
Guar. and Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968), which allowed the mother to recover for
the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, were the foundations for the development
of illegitimates' rights in Louisiana.-
6. In Labine, the equal protection analysis merely required that the statute bear
a rational relationship to any legitimate state purpose. 401 U.S. at 539. The dissent
argued that the majority had simply deferred to the state's power to regulate and had
totally disregarded the application of this test. 401 U.S. at 548 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
This extremely deferential approach gave way to a more exacting equal protection
analysis. See Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 767 (1977).
7. The United States Supreme Court in decisions after Labine rejected the con-
cept that by imposing sanctions on the illegitimate children, men and women's acti-
vities could be confined to the legitimate family relationship. Trimble v. Gordon, 430
U.S. 762, 769 (1977); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972). The
Louisiana Supreme Court in Brown noted the injustice of the sanctions: "[w]e agree
that the innocent children should not suffer from the promiscuous adventures of their
parents." 388 So. 2d at 1153.
8. The Supreme Court attempted to distinguish Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68
(1968), from the law at issue in the Labine case. The Court wrote: "We emphasize that
this is not a case, like Levy where the State has created an insurmountable barrier to
this illegitimate child. There is not the slightest suggestion in this case that Louisiana
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from sharing in the father's. succession, since there were various
alternative methods by which the father could protect the child,
should he choose to do so, during his lifetime. The Court concluded
that, under the facts of the case, the state's choices exemplified in
article 919 were permissible under the Equal Protection Clause.
After Labine, equal protection analysis in cases involving the
classification of birth underwent significant change. The most impor-
tant decision of the period following Labine was Trimble v. Gordon,'
which involved an Illinois statute allowing an illegitimate child to in-
herit from the natural mother, but not from the natural father."0 The
Court refused to recognize illegitimacy as a "suspect classification"
requiring strict scrutiny," but noted that the statute must bear a
rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose" and that the
scrutiny to be applied in cases involving illegitimacy status "is not a
toothless one."'"
has barred this illegitimate from inheriting from her father." 401 U.S. at 539.
The Court described the various methods by which the father could have assured
his illegitimate daughter of a share in his succession. Id. It would appear that the
Court granted great weight to the "no insurmountable barrier" argument.
9. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). Many other cases involved equal protection challenges in
which the United States Supreme Court struck down state and federal provisions on
the basis that they unreasonably discriminated against illegitimates. See Jimenez v.
Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rights Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S.
619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406
U.S. 164 (1972); Beaty v. Weinberger, 478 F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), aff'd, 418 U.S. 901
(1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F. Supp. 1226 (D. Md.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972);
David v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp. 588 (D. Conn.), aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972). For a
thorough discussion of these cases and their contribution to the recognition and protec-
tion of the illegitimate's rights, see Lorio, Succession Rights of Illegitimates in Lou-
isiana. 24 Loy. L. REV. 1 (1978). See also Comment, Can Louisiana's Succession Laws
Survive in Light of the Supreme Court's Recent Recognition of Illegitimates'Rights?,
39 LA. L. REV. 1132 (1979).
10. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (1973). The statute required the father to marry the
illegitimate child's mother and to acknowledge the child as his own in order for the
child to inherit from "the father who died intestate. The child would be classified as
legitimate; thus, the state effectively precluded any illegitimate child from sharing in
the succession of the deceased father.
11. 430 U.S. at 767. This argument was asserted and rejected in the previous year
in Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976). The Court was of the opinion that
similarities existed between the classification of illegitimates and those of the suspect
classifications but concluded that strict scrutiny was not required. Id. at 506. The only
classifications recognized by the Supreme Court as suspect are race, nationality, and
alienage. See Comment, supra note 9, at 1135 n.16.
12. The Court noted that the justification of a state law involves more than the
"mere incantation of a proper state purpose." The constitutionality of the law in
question "depends upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to
legitimate legislative aims." 430 U.S. at 769, citing Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495,
504 (1976).
13. See Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1976).
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Applying an intermediate level of scrutiny, the Court dismissed
the state's argument that such a law would promote legitimate family
relationships-an assertion which had been recognized by the Court
as a valid state interest in Labine"-and noted that such a statute
"bears only the most attenuated relationship to the asserted goal.""8
The Trimble Court also rejected the state's contention that the law
did not create an "insurmountable barrier" for the illegitimate child
to inherit from his natural father.' Focus on the presence or
absence of such a barrier confused the analysis, the Court explained,
and thus the availability of alternatives to the father was afforded
no constitutional significance.'7 The state's interest in regulating the
disposition of property within the state upon death was recognized
as legitimate and important, but the Court was of the opinion that
the means employed by the state to achieve that goal were not suffi-
ciently related to that interest. 8 The Illinois law, effecting a
statutory exclusion of all illegitimates insofar as inheriting from their
fathers was concerned, was therefore unconstitutional. The Trimble
Court recognized that the Illinois statute could be distinguished
from Civil Code article 919 at issue in Labine, but nonetheless noted
that "[d]espite these differences, it is apparent that we have examined
the Illinois statute more critically than the Court examined the
Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent that our analysis in this
case differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis controls.'",
Recognizing that the stricter analysis of Trimble foreshadowed
the eventual overruling of Labine,2° the Louisiana Supreme Court
14. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536-37 (1971).
15. 430 U.S. at 768.
16. Id. at 773. See note 8, supra.
17. 430 U.S. at 773-74.
18. Id. at 770-71. The failure of the lower court to consider a compromise between
the two extremes of individual determinations of paternity and complete exclusion of
all illegitimates was viewed by the Court as the deciding factor in its determination
that the Illinois law was unconstitutional. In effect the statute was overinclusive, in
that the means selected by the state were not closely tailored to accomplish the
legitimate state ends of protecting the orderly disposition of property at death and the
stability of land titles. Id. at 771.
19. Id. at 776 n.17.
20. Two cases decided after the Trimble decision, although dealing with testate
successions, demonstrated the acceptance and application by the Louisiana Supreme
Court of a more searching and exacting analysis of asserted state goals and their
rational relation to the state law in question. Succession of Robins, 349 So. 2d 276 (La.
1977), held article 1488 of the Louisiana Civil Code unconstitutional. Article 1488
restricted the freedom of the natural father or mother to dispose of property by
testament to children born of an adulterous relationship by limiting such dispositions
to nothing more than that required for the child's sustenance. Succession of Thompson,
367 So. 2d 796 (La. 1979), invalidated article 1483, which prohibited acknowledged ille-
gitimate children from receiving from their natural father or mother by donation inter-
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held article 919 unconstitutional in Succession of Brown.2 In Brown,
the right of the four acknowledged illegitimate children to share in
the intestate succession of their father under article 919 was depen-
dent on the absence of legitimate descendants of their father. The
father had, however, adopted one of his acknowledged illegitimate
children, and she was recognized by the trial court as the sole heir,
thus excluding the plaintiffs.' The Second Circuit Court of Appeal
reversed the trial court's decision and held article 919 to be uncon-
stitutional.23 On appeal to the Louisiana Supreme Court, the issue
squarely presented to the court was the constitutionality of article
919." The equal protection analysis used to review the statute was
entirely different from the test of minimum rationality earlier applied
to article 919 by the United States Supreme Court in Labine.2' Guided
by the Court's later pronouncements in Trimble and Lalli v. Lalli,
the Louisiana Supreme Court studied the article to determine if the
classification was "substantially related to permissible state inter-
ests." The court considered the three interests asserted by the state
to justify the Louisiana law, rejecting, as had Trimble, arguments
that such a law promoted legitimate family relationships and the
contention that alternatives were readily available to the father to
ensure the illegitimate a part of his succession.28 The focus of the
vivos or mortis causa property in excess of that necessary for the child's sustenance
whenever there were legitimate descendants.
21. 388 So. 2d 1151 (La. 1980).
22. Under the provisions of Civil Code article 214 the adopted child becomes the
legitimate child of the adoptive parent(s) and is accorded the right to inherit from the
adoptive parent(s) as if the child were actually the legitimate child of the adoptive
parent(s). Thus the adopted child in Brown was recognized as the legitimate descen-
dant of the deceased father and under article 919 primed the claims of the illegitimate
children.
23. 379 So. 2d 1172, 1178 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1980).
24. Quiett v. Estate of Moore, 378 So. 2d 362 (1979), on original hearing, involved
the constitutionality of article 919. The plurality opinion, however, held that the issue
of constitutionality was not properly before the court and decided the case on other
grounds. In an excellent dissenting opinion, Justice Tate argued that article 919 should
be ruled unconstitutional and submitted an equal protection analysis to justify such a
holding. 378 So. 2d at 365-66 (Tate, J., dissenting). On rehearing the Louisiana Supreme
Court once again decided the case on other grounds, avoiding the question of article
919's constitutionality. 378 So. 2d at 367.
25. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). The two-tiered analysis used in Labine and other cases,
citing City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976), was no longer applicable, the
court explained. An intermediate level of analysis had been developed for certain
classifications, including illegitimates, and the court cited Lalli and Trimble as
examples of intermediate scrutiny. For other categories determined by the United
States Supreme Court to require such analysis, see Orr v. Orr, 440 U.S. 268 (1979)
(sex); Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976) (birth).
26. 439 U.S. 259 (1978).
27. 388 So. 2d at 1153.
28. Id.
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court was primarily on the state interest, recognized as valid in
Trimble,' in the orderly disposition of property after death and the
permissible means by which the state could provide protection of
such interest."0 Article 919 was deficient because it barred all
acknowledged illegitimates from sharing in the intestate succession
of their father if he left legitimate relations or a surviving spouse."1
The case did not involve the problems of proof of paternity and
spurious claims, since the children had been acknowledged by their
father. 2 The court was able to focus, instead, upon the unequal
treatment of illegitimates. The emphasis of the court apparently was
based on the consideration that there were ways in which illegiti-
mates could be accorded greater rights, while at the same time
balancing the important state interest in stable land titles and the
orderly disposition of property. Since, in the court's opinion, article
919 was not such a balancing, but rather a flat denial of succession
rights to the acknowledged illegitimate if other relatives existed,"
the provision arbitrarily discriminated against those illegitimates
and denied them the equal protection of the law.
The equal protection analysis in Brown was applied only to
acknowledged illegitimates; the rights of unacknowledged illegiti-
mates were not discussed because a narrow fact situation was pre-
sented in Brown. However, the Louisiana legislature, perhaps rely-
ing on the probable affirmance of the Second Circuit Court of Appeal's
decision, amended articles 208 and 209 and repealed articles 210 and
212 of the Louisiana Civil Code."4 These amended articles go much
29. 430 U.S. at 770-71.
30. 388 So. 2d 1153.
31. Considering the chances that some legitimate relatives, especially collateral
relations, will exist, the acknowledged illegitimate usually will be effectively barred
from inheriting from the deceased father.
32. See LA. CiV. CODE art. 203. Informal acknowledgment of the illegitimate child
is also recognized by the Louisiana courts and consists of proof of any express or
implied recognition of the child by the parent. See Taylor v. Allen, 151 La. 82, 91 So.
635 (1921). See also R. PASCAL & K. SPAHT, LOUISIANA FAMILY LAW COURSE § 13.8 (2d
ed. 1979); Spaht & Shaw, The Strongest Presumption Challenged: Speculations on
Warren v. Richard and Succession of Mitchell, 37 LA. L. REV. 59, 61 n.7 (1976).
33. 388 So. 2d at 1153-54.
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1 provides:
"Illegitimate children who have not been acknowledged as provided in Article 203,
may be allowed to prove their filiation."
LA. CIv. CODE art. 209, as amended by 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1, states:
1. An illegitimate child may be entitled to a rebuttable presumption of filiation
under the provisions of this Article. Or any child may establish filiation,
regardless of the circumstances of conception, by a civil proceeding instituted by
the child or on his behalf in the parish of his birth, or other proper venue as pro-
vided by law, within the time limitation prescribed in this Article.
2. A child who is shown to be the child of a woman on an original certificate of
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further than the decision in Brown, setting up a procedure by which
unacknowledged children may prove filiation entitling them to share
in their fathers' succession.
Under the new legislation, a child not formally acknowledged
under the provisions of article 20311 may establish his filiation in a
civil proceeding by a preponderance of the evidence 6 tending to
prove paternity." The amended legislation includes a special section
that provides:
Any illegitimate child nineteen years of age or older shall have
one year from the effective date of this Act to bring a civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation under the provisions of this act and
if no such proceeding is instituted within such time, the claim of
such an illegitimate child shall be forever barred. 8
birth is presumed to be the child of that woman, though the contrary may be
shown by a preponderance of the evidence.
3. An illegitimate child not shown as the child of a woman on an original certi-
ficate of birth may prove filiation by any means which establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, including acknowledgment in a testament, that he
is the illegitimate child of that woman.
4. A child of a man may prove filiation by any means which establish, by a
preponderance of the evidence, including acknowledgment in a testament, that he
is the child of that man. Evidence that the mother and alleged father were known
as living in a state of concubinage and resided as such at the time when the child
was conceived creates a rebuttable presumption of filiation between the child and
the alleged father.
5. Proof of filiation must be made by evidence of events, conduct, or other infor-
mation which occurred during the lifetime of the alleged parent. A civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation must be brought within six months after the death of
the alleged parent, or within nineteen years of the illegitimate child's birth,
whichever occurs first. If an illegitimate child is born posthumously, a civil pro-
ceeding to establish filiation must be instituted within six months of its birth,
unless there is a presumption of filiation as set forth in Section 2 above. If no pro-
ceeding is timely instituted the claim of an illegitimate child or on its behalf to
rights in the succession of the alleged parent shall be forever barred. The time
limitation provided in this Article shall run against all persons, including minors
and interdicts.
35. LA. CIv. CODE art. 203, as amended by 1979 La. Acts, No. 607, § 1, provides:
"The acknowledgment of an illegitimate child shall be made by a declaration executed
before a notary public, in the presence of two witnesses, by the father and mother of
either of them, or it may be made in the registering of the birth or baptism of such
child."
36. The original legislation proposed to the legislature included the term "clear
and convincing evidence." La. S.B. 1060, § 1, Original, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980). This was
deleted and "preponderance of the evidence," the standard burden of proof in civil
cases and a much less stringent requirement than "clear and convincing," was inserted
in lieu thereof by amendment in the House Committee on Civil Law and Procedure.
37. See Developments in the Law, 1979-1980-Persons, 41 LA. L. REV. 385 (1980)
(hereinafter cited as Persons, 1979-1980].
38. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 4.
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As suggested by Professor Spaht, 9 the legislature may have included
this section because it anticipated that Succession of Brown would be
applied retroactively."
By remanding the case in Brown to the trial court for an
accounting to be made by the adopted child and a new judgment of
possession to be rendered recognizing plaintiffs as heirs along with
the adopted child, the court undoubtedly intended its decision to be
retroactive, at least as to the litigants." If the court chooses to apply
Brown retroactively as to the litigants but prospectively as to all
others, such a decision will most probably follow the reasoning of a
recent dissenting opinion in Corpus Christi Parish Credit Union v.
Martin.2 At issue in that case were provisions of the Louisiana Civil
Code allowing the husband, alone, to mortgage or sell community
immovable property acquired in both spouses' names.' The dissent
would have declared the code articles unconstitutional and applied
such a ruling prospectively to all but the actual litigants in the Martin
case. Justification for a very limited retroactive application of the
decision was based on the desire by the dissent to insure that the
discussion of the law's invalidity would not "be considered merely as
dicta"" and also because of the particular equities involved in the
Martin case. 5 Included in these equities in Martin were misrepre-
sentations by the lender to the wife that she was without legal
remedy to prevent her husband from mortgaging the property. The
dissent seemed to imply that absent "peculiar" equities in the case,
39. Persons, 1979-1980, supra note 37, at 387.
40. The first circuit appears to have assumed that Brown's effect is retroactive.
In Succession of Richardson, 392 So. 2d 105 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1980), the appellate
court reversed a trial court judgment recognizing a collateral relation as the
decedent's sole heir and remanded the case with instructions that the decedent's
acknowledged illegitimate son be recognized as heir. The decedent died on October 30,
1978, and the court followed Brown without discussing the retroactivity question.
The issue of whether or not the holding by a court that a statute is unconstitu-
tional should be applied only to cases arising thereafter or to cases commenced before
the date of the decision involves a number of considerations. See Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 627 (1965), quoting Chicot County Drainage Dist. v. Baxter State Bank,
308 U.S. 371 (1940). See generally Traynor, Quo Vadis, Prospective Overruling: A
Question of Judicial Responsibility, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 533 (1977); Currier, Time and
Change in Judge-Made Law: Prospective Overruling, 51 VA. L. REV. 201 (1965);
Comment, Retrospective Effect of an Overruling Decision, 7 LA. L. REV. 133 (1946).
41. The Second Circuit Court of Appeal remanded the case and the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed this holding of retroactive application insofar as the four
acknowledged illegitimate children were concerned. 388 So. 2d at 1154.
42. 358 So. 2d 295, 299 (La. 1978) (Tate, J., dissenting).
43. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 2334 & 2404 (as they appeared prior to 1979 La. Acts,
No. 709).
44. 358 So. 2d at 303.
45. Id. at 303 n.4.
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the decision should not be given retroactive application. In Brown
equities peculiarly applicable only to the litigants in that case do not
appear to exist.
A second option of the court would be to give the Brown deci-
sion an expanded retroactive application to a date prior to the Trimble
decision. Other jurisdictions have considered such a date, but the
cases therein involved invalidation of statutes similar to that held
unconstitutional in Trimble, at a period in time much closer to the
actual decision in Trimble. Pendleton v. Pendleton"8 involved the
claim of an illegitimate child to a share in his father's succession and
was pending at the time of the Trimble decision. The Kentucky
Supreme Court declared that the invalidation of the state statute
would "have no retroactive effect upon the devolution of any title
occurring before April 26, 1977 (the date of the Trimble opinion),
except for those specific instances in which the dispositive constitu-
tional issue raised in this case was in the process of litigation." 7
An Arkansas Supreme Court decision considered whether retro-
active effect should be given to Trimble to invalidate the disposition
of property upon the intestate's death in 1972.8 The plaintiff claimed
to be the deceased's illegitimate child and instituted suit based upon
the premise that the Trimble case had struck down an Illinois
statute similar to that in effect in Arkansas.'9 The court recognized
that the Arkansas statute was invalid under Trimble, but the court
denied the plaintiff's demand, finding that Trimble should not be
applied retroactively. Considered as the main reasons for denying
retroactive application were the adverse effect on the certainty of
land titles and the accompanying interference with the development
of real property." Such an extended retroactive application would
create, in the court's opinion, too much instability in land titles by
allowing a larger number of illegitimates to attack the title to real
property, alleging that they Were the ones who should have in-
herited the property."
A third option available to the court is the date of the Trimble
decision, April 26, 1977. To extend the Brown decision retroactively
46. 560 S.W.2d 538 (Ky. 1978).
47. Id. at 539.
48. Frakes v. Hunt, 583 S.W.2d 479 (Ark. 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 942 (1979).
49. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 61-141(d) allowed an illegitimate child to inherit from his
mother in the same manner as a legitimate child, but prohibited the illegitimate from
inheriting from the father.
50. 583 S.W.2d at 499.
51. Id. at 498. The dissenting opinion, noting that Trimble's remand was not pro-
spective only in application, argued that the court should assume that Trimble had
retroactive effect until the Supreme Court decided otherwise. 583 S.W.2d at 503
(Fogleman, J., dissenting).
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to this date, the Louisiana court would have to interpret Trimble as
having in effect overruled Labine, thus rendering article 919 uncon-
stitutional on that date. The Trimble decision sets forth the proper
means of equal protection analysis but distinguished article 919 of
the Lousiana Civil Code from the statute at issue in Labine.52 The
reasoning in favor of this date would probably be that, had the Lou-
isiana courts applied this stricter analysis to article 919 at the date
of the Trimble decision, they would have invalidated the Louisiana
statute. This would have vested rights in acknowledged illegitimates
to share in the successions of their deceased intestate fathers.
However, Trimble did not expressly overrule Labine, thereby invali-
dating article 9 1 9 ,a and the Louisiana courts may be hesitant to use
this kind of extended analysis to apply Brown retroactively to the
date of the Trimble decision.
The date of Sidney Brown's death, January 1, 1978, is the fourth
option open to the court in determining the possible retroactive
application of the Brown decision. As will be discussed later,5 this
may be the most logical point from which to allow illegitimates to
assert their newly acquired rights.55 The actual invalidation of arti-
cle 919 resulted from litigation arising out of the death of Brown,
and his acknowledged illegitimate children, based on the remand of
the case in Brown, are to be extended the benefits of that invali-
dation. This equitable application of the decision in Brown to similarly
situated parties is the strongest policy argument in favor of such
retroactive operation.
There are other alternative dates available to the court," but the
52. See text at note 19, supra.,
53. See Lorio, supra note 9, at 2; Comment, supra note 9, at 1132.
54. See text at note 72, infra.
55. In Allen v. Harvey, 568 S.W.2d 829 (Tenn. 1978), the Tennesee Supreme Court
applied its invalidation of a statute similar to that in Trimble prospectively, except as
to "any cases pending in the courts of Tennessee on the date this opinion is released,
asserting the right of children born out of wedlock to inherit from their natural
father." Id. at 835. The holding was limited "to cases where paternity is established by
clear and convincing proof and to cases where rights of inheritance have not finally
vested." Id.
The holding in Allen protects bona fide purchasers who acted in reliance on the
belief that no illegitimate child existed or that the illegitimate was not entitled to a
share of the succession under the existing Tennessee statute. This would not be possi-
ble in Louisiana because R.S. 9:5682 allows an heir excluded from a succession to bring
an action to recover property acquired by third persons from the recognized heirs
within ten years of the judgment of possession.
56. The effective date of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution which included in article
1, section 3 the following: "[n]o law shall arbitrarily, capriciously, or unreasonably
discriminate against a person because of birth," LA. CONST. art. I, § 3, was January 1,
1975. The 1974 constitution contained another section which provides: "Laws which are
in conflict with this constitution shall cease upon its effective date." LA. CONST. art.
NOTES 13231981]
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above seem to be the most plausible in considering the application
to be given the Brown decision. In determining the issue of retro-
activity the court should examine, in the context of the four options
mentioned, the effect each date would have on the general purpose
of Brown, that is, the granting of greater rights in intestate succes-
sions to acknowledged illegitimate children." Also to be considered
are the newly-acquired rights of unacknowledged illegitimate
children as provided in Act 549 of 1980.'
Under the provisions of recently amended article 208, a child
formally acknowledged under article 203 is not required to bring a
proceeding to prove filiation." Also, the formally acknowledged child
is not included in the special section of the Act allowing one year
from July 23, 1980, for the illegitimate to bring a civil proceeding.
Thus, the formally acknowledged child's main concern with regard
to the issue of retroactivity of the Brown decision is the date from
which he can exercise his rights. Consider, for example, a child who
was formally acknowledged and whose father died in September of
1977. If the court determined that Brown was retroactive to the
Trimble decision, April 26, 1977, then this child could attack a judg-
ment of possession in his father's succession in which he was not
recognized as an heir. This child could also bring an action under
Louisiana Revised Statute 9:5682, which provides:
An action by a person who is an heir or legatee of a deceased
person, and who has not been recognized as such in the judg-
ment of possession rendered in the succession of the deceased
by a court of competent jurisdiction, to assert any right, title, or
interest in any of the property formerly owned by the deceased
against a third person who has acquired this property from or
through a person recognized as an heir or legatee of the deceased
in this judgment of possession, is prescribed in ten years .... "
This section would allow the child to recover succession property
alienated by the heirs to third parties, so long as the action is
brought within ten years of the registry of the judgment of posses-
sion." Thus, this ten-year liberative prescription is the only time
XIV, § 18(B). Argument can be made that this section had the effect of invalidating ar-
ticle 919 of the Civil Code.
57. 388 So. 2d at 1154.
58. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 1.
59. See note 34, supra.
60. See Persons, 1979-1980, supra note 37, at 387.
61. LA. R.S. 9:5682 (Supp. 1977).
62. The statute further provides that the ten-year period will run from "the
registry of the judgment of possession in the conveyance records of the parish where
the property is situated ...." Id.
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limitation acknowledged illegitimates will be concerned with once
the court determines the retroactive date of Brown.
An unacknowledged illegitimate child, nineteen years of age or
older, has one year, ending July 23, 1981, within which to bring a
civil proceeding to establish filiation."3 If the child fails to do so, his
claim will be barred by the running of this peremptive period. For
the purpose of illustration assume the following facts: a twenty-
eight-year-old unacknowledged illegitimate whose father died in May
of 1979, brings a civil proceeding to establish filiation and is suc-
cessful in doing so within the provided time period. If the court
determines that Brown should be applied retroactively to the date
of Sidney Brown's death, January 1, 1978, this child will be allowed
to exercise the rights given to him by the amended articles. How-
ever, if the court chooses to apply Brown retroactively only as to
the litigants but prospectively as to all others, this child will be
precluded from sharing in his father's succession. This child will
have to be concerned with both the one-year peremptive period for
bringing the proceeding and also the decision by the court as to
Brown's retroactive effect.
In the newly amended legislation there is a provision which en-
titles a child conceived while the mother and alleged father were
known to be living in a state of concubinage to a rebuttable pre-
sumption of filiation to the alleged father.6 ' It is unclear whether
this child is included in the special section of Act 549 requiring him
to bring a civil proceeding to establish filiation within the peremp-
tive period." Thus, the concern of this child will be whether or not
he is included in this section; if the child is not included, he will
occupy a position equivalent to that of an acknowledged illegitimate
child, as previously discussed." Perhaps it would be wise for those
children entitled to a rebuttable presumption to bring the proceeding
rather than to take the chance that their claims would be barred by
the running of the time period.
The final situation created by the Brown decision and the recent
amendments to articles 208 and 209 is the plight of the unac-
63. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 4.
64. Id. at § 1.
65. Professor Spaht suggests that:
[b]ecause of the statutory language, if an illegitimate child is entitled to the
presumption of filiation, he may invoke it in any proceeding at any time without
the limitation of the prescriptive period in article 209. Such an interpretation,
however, violates the obvious legislative intent to avoid the problem of "stale
claims" referred to by the court of appeal in Succession of Brown.
Persons, 1979-1980, supra note 37, at 385-86.
66. See text at note 59, supra.
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knowledged illegitimate child under the age of nineteen whose
father died more than six months before the effective date of Act
549, July 23, 1980. This child is prohibited from exercising any
rights in his father's intestate succession, since he is not included in
the section allowing one year within which illegitimates over the
age of nineteen may bring a civil proceeding. This child or his tutor
will be unconcerned with the issue of retroactivity of the Brown
decision because he is already excluded from exercising any succes-
sion rights. It is questionable whether the effect of this omission in
the legislation is constitutional. 7
Considerations to be studied by the court militating against the
retroactive application of the decision in Brown include the impor-
tant state interests in orderly disposition of property at death,"8 the
stability of land titles, 9 and the rights of third parties who have
relied on the prior law." These factors must be weighed against the
possible inequities which could result if other similarly situated
parties are denied the benefits accorded to the litigants in Brown.
If Brown were applied retroactively to a date before the Trimble
decision, the effect would be to create a significant amount of uncer-
tainty in the title to immIovable property. The possibility that there
exists either a legitimate or illegitimate child with a claim against a
third party for an interest in succession property could be substan-
tially increased. These same third parties may be unwilling to purchase
succession property as a consequence of this increased uncertainty.
Such an expanded retroactive application would be unwise in light
of the almost certain accompanying instability of titles and the
possible interference with the improvement of immovable property.
Other jurisdictions have recognized this and denied retroactive
application accordingly."
However, the other dates previously mentioned do not appear to
pose at least as much of a problem with the certainty of titles as
67. In light of the lower level of equal protection analysis applied to cases involv-
ing the classification of age, a challenge based on equal protection grounds may not be
successful. See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976).
However, stronger argument can be made that this omission violates due process in
that is not only denies the child a reasonable time within which the child could assert
his rights but in fact precludes the child from doing so.
68. 388 So. 2d at 1153. A more in-depth discussion is contained in the court of ap-
peal's decision. See Succession of Brown, 379 So. 2d 1172, 1175-76 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1980).
69. As recognized in Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977), even the valid state
interest of protecting the stability of land titles and regulating the orderly disposition
of property is not absolute. Id. at 771.
70. See text at note 61, supra.
71. See text at notes 46-51, supra.
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expanded retroactive application would. For different reasons
already discussed, 2 the date of the Trimble decision should be rejected.
It is submitted that the most logical date from which to apply the
Brown decision retroactively is the date of the death of Sidney
Brown, January 1, 1978. The extent to which the stability and cer-
tainty of titles would be affected would be limited to deaths occur-
ring on or after that date or to successions pending on that date,
whichever should be determined by the Louisiana Supreme Court.
This would allow litigants in similar situations to exercise the same
rights and benefits the litigants in Brown were afforded. All
unacknowledged children over the age of nineteen who would be
covered by this retroactive application must bring their proceeding
to establish filiation by July 23, 1981." This should expedite the
disposition of these claims and help to ease the burden on judicial
administration created by retroactive application. If Brown only
applies to deaths occurring after January 1, 1978, the fear of stale
claims will, for the most part, be avoided, and judgments of filiation
will be obtained within a period of time allowing reasonable adminis-
tration.
Also, the rights of third parties with regard to succession prop-
erty will, in all probability, not be impaired to any substantially
greater extent. Under Brown the formally acknowledged illegitimate
child would be considered an heir under R.S. 9:5682"' and must be
allowed the same succession rights as a legitimate descendant. 5 To
allow the acknowledged illegitimate to bring the same action as a
legitimate child not recognized in a judgment of possession and to
recover succession property in the hands of a third person does not
violate the policy behind the statute." Instead, it eliminates the arbi-
trary discrimination that once existed in this area. If the problem is
viewed as insufficient protection for third parties, then the problem
lies with the statute and not with the fact that acknowledged ille-
gitimates are now allowed to bring the same action. The protection
of third parties is clearly a valid state goal, and quite possibly the
72. See text at notes 52-53, supra.
73. 1980 La. Acts, No. 549, § 4.
74. LA. R.S. 9:5682 (Supp. 1977).
75. Professor Pascal recommended that "the acknowledged illegitimate shall be
considered to have his inheritance and his legitime primarily in the form of a credit
against the deceased's succession, rather than that of a fractional interest .... "
Pascal, Lousiana Succession and Related Laws and the Illegitimate: Thoughts Promp-
ted by Labine v. Vincent, 56 TUL. L. REV. 167, 181 (1971).
76. In Jackson v. DAubin, 338 So. 2d 575 (La. 1976), the Louisiana Supreme Court
stated what it considered to be the purpose of R.S. 9:5682: "the legislature has
endeavored to give a measure of protection to third persons who acquire property
from or through a recognized (but not necessarily a true) heir or legatee." Id. at 581.
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statute should be amended to shorten the liberative prescriptive
period to a shorter limit, such as one year." However, the fact that
illegitimates now will be able to bring suit based on this statute
should not control the disposition of the retroactivity issue.
In light of the factors of equity to similarly situated litigants,"8
the more limited effect the decision would have on stability of land
titles and the orderly disposition of property, the avoidance of stale
claims in proceedings to establish filiation, and minimal interference
with the rights of third persons, it is respectfully submitted that the
date of Sidney Brown's death is the most logical and most equitable
choice available.
It should be recognized that the decision in Brown, whatever its
ultimate application, can be viewed as a substantial development in
the area of illegitimate's rights in Louisiana intestate succession
law. The case's impact on intestate successions certainly will be
realized and probaby will influence changes in related areas of the
law, including testate successions and the concept of forced
heirship. 9 In view of these far-reaching effects, it is extremely
important that the extent of retroactive effect of the decision in
Succession of Brown be clarified as soon as possible.
Vance A. Gibbs
THE SUPERVISOR AS AN AMERICAN HOSTAGE:
Belcher Towing Company v. NLRB
Captain Frank Mosso of the Belcher Towing Company was
discharged after failing to report union activity aboard the company-
77. In this way a third person would obtain good title in one year from the date of
the judgment of possession rather than ten years. This limited period would help to
remove some of the uncertainty surrounding title to immovable property.
78. Succession of King, No. 7,612 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1980), would present a difficult
factual situation to the court. An illegitimate child, whose birth certificate named King
as the father, and who had always been recognized publicly as King's child, claimed
she was an acknowledged illegitimate and attacked the constitutionality of article 919.
The Third Circuit Court of Appeal did not decide the issue of the constitutionality of
the provision, finding that such a constitutional challenge must be raised at trial. The
court dismissed the child's claim. It appears that the court would consider the case res
judicata as to the child in King and would deny any rights in her father's intestate suc-
cession.
79. For a discussion of the effects of the Brown decision on other areas of Loui-
siana succession law, see Comment, Another Look at Louisiana Succession Law: The
Ramifcation8 of Succession of Brown, 41 LA. L. REv. 1256 (1981).
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